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Pension Incentives and Premature Retirement
Abstract
This is a study of people’s retirement timing under defined benefit pension plans (DB plans). The actuarial
structure of DB pensions generally creates strong incentive for people to stay with their employers, at least to
their early retirement ages, not to retire beforehand. Upon tracking respondents covered by DB plans in the
Wave I (1992 cohort) of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) until they left their 1992 employers, we
found that a significant percentage of people (about 17%) left their jobs prior to their early retirement ages.
Why did people leave prematurely? Several possible hypotheses were considered and examined. Through
simple tabulation analyses, we found that workers in the early-leaving group tend to have significantly smaller
pension benefits and significantly poorer knowledge about their pensions. The impact of self-reported health
status and early retirement windows were not evident. Logistic regressions showed that conditional on age
dummies, pension size, and having basic pension knowledge was strongly negatively correlated to premature
departure. Both excellent and poor health statuses correlate positively with early departure. Accepting an
early-out window also had a significantly positive correlation with early departure.
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1. Introduction 
The world is experiencing an unprecedented population aging that will be 
profound and enduring. This is especially prominent and serious for developed 
countries like the United States. As of 2007, 17.2% of U.S. population was 
over 60 years old. 12.4% of the population was over 70 years old. These 
figures will increase to 23.8% and 17.7% by 2025, and 26.4% and 20.6% by 
2050.1 Older workers who are retired have to rely on cash flows generated by 
their cumulated wealth and other members in the society (in form of Social 
Security, Medicare etc) for the rest of their lives. By the time of retirement, the 
wealth of a typical American household normally includes real estate(s), 
financial assets, private pensions and Social Security. How important is 
pension among these? There have been estimates that “the wealth equivalents 
of pension and Social Security together amount to almost half of the wealth 
held by all households. The figure is even higher-over sixty percent-of total 
wealth for households who are in the 45th to 55th percentile of wealth 
holders.”2 Therefore, pension studies, as an essential part of labor economics 
and welfare economics, have become more and more significant. 
A pension plan is a legally binding contract having an explicit retirement 
objective. There are two broad categories of pensions: public and private. 
Most developed countries have public pension plans very similar to the Social 
Security program in the United States. Private pension plans include IRA 
(Individual Retirement Accounts), Keogh plans (HR10 plans) and 
employer-provided pension plans. The focus of this paper is one type of 
“employer-provided pension plan: “defined benefit (DB) plan”. 3  A 
“traditional” defined benefit plan provides an annuity for an employee upon 
that employee's retirement, the size of which is determined by a formula that 
usually incorporates the employee's pay (typically the average salary in last 
few years), years of employment and age at retirement. The monthly/annual 
retirement benefits under DB plans are assured, which means it is the 
                                                        
1
 The figures and predictions are from World Population Ageing 2007 by United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs.  
2
 See Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick and Steinmeier (1997). 
3
 Apart from DB plans, defined contribution (DC) plan is another important category of 
employer-provided pension plans, which is now the mainstream. Under a DC plan, each 
participant has an individual account to which the employee and the employer contribute. The 
employee then chooses where to invest. (Usually the employee has multiple investment 
options.) DC pensions are mostly portable, i.e., the retirement account can be carried with the 
person as he/she moves to a new job. And he/she and the new employer can go on 
contributing to it on top of the existed contribution. At the time of retirement, what a person 
has in his/her account is his/her retirement benefits. The retirement benefits depend both on 
the amount he/she is contributed and on the investment decisions. The employees bear the 
investment risks in DC plans. 401(k), 403(b), TSP (Thrift Saving Plans) are typical DC plans. 
Besides, there are cash balance plans and hybrid plans provided by some employers.  
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employers’ responsibility to make investment decisions with their pension 
fund, bear the investment risks, and give their retirees the guaranteed benefits 
regularly. 
Pensions, just as safety nets in other forms, will alter people’s behavior. In 
particular, labor economists have studied how pensions influence retirement 
decisions. Defined-benefit pensions have two particular features of interest: 
first, most defined benefit pensions tend to exhibit a J-shaped benefit 
accruals.4 Here “accrual” is the increment of present value of one’s pension 
benefit, from one more year of service in the pension-providing employer. 
J-shaped benefit accruals mean that the present value of pension benefits 
accumulate very slowly during one’s early years in the company but accelerate 
significantly in one’s mid-ages. Second, defined benefit plans normally specify 
a “normal retirement age (NR)” and an “early retirement age (ER)”; both of 
which depend on years of employment in that firm (“tenure years”), as well as 
biological age per se, which differs among individuals in the same plan under 
most circumstances5. The “normal retirement age” is the earliest age after 
which you can retire and get the assured retirement benefits right away. The 
“early retirement age”, which is normally two to five years younger than the 
normal retirement age6, is the earliest age you can retire from the job and get a 
“reduced annual benefit”. For plans having both NR and ER specifications, 
there is usually a huge accrual spike at early retirement age, which means 
one’s pension wealth (in present value) will greatly increase if he/she stays one 
more year passed that age. There will be a modest increment in pension 
accrual from ER to NR and another smaller accrual spike at NR. After NR, the 
accrual can sometimes be negative.7 In theory, these features of DB pensions 
create strong incentives on people’s retirement timing: on one hand, it 
“punishes” the departures prior to ER (in that case one will miss the accrual 
spike), deterring some retirement intentions; on the other hand, it doesn’t 
provide any financial incentive for people to stay past NR, discouraging the 
labor supply of older people. Combining these two effects, one should 
naturally expect a “retirement peak” around ER in response to these 
                                                        
4
 The reasons why firms want to adopt this “J-shaped” pension design might be multi-fold: 
first, the J-shaped accrual pattern has actuarial advantages: the interest discounting becomes 
less of a matter as people get closer to retirement age. Also, by heightening the potential loss 
of being fired or leaving at young ages, this design can stabilize labor force and can keep 
employees from shirking in their jobs for most of their careers etc. See Gustman and 
Steinmeier (1988) for more discussion on these. What we are interested in is that this kind of 
structure creates incentive against premature departure, as will be mentioned later.  
5
 There are plans in which ER and/or NR doesn’t depend on when the worker started.  
6
 ER can be 7 to 10 years before NR. 
7
 See Table 22 in Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick and Steinmeier (1997) and Fig 2 in Samwick 
(1998) for reference. 
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The data used in this study is Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a 
longitudinal dataset that has linked pension plans and the people who are 
covered by them. HRS combines self-reported data (HRS biennial core 
surveys), employer-reported data and Social Security Administration (SSA) 
data on pensions and collects extensive information including people’s health 
(physical and mental), job and income history, financial status (well-being and 
knowledge) and also employment and retirement planning. These features 
make HRS a really powerful source for this study. 
The study is limited to DB pension holders. Researchers can calculate DB 
pension benefits relatively accurately with the help of employer-provided plan 
descriptions. Also, because of above-mentioned structures of DB plans, we can 
define a benchmark for premature departure, which is the ER9, without much 
dispute. On the contrary, in DC plans, the employee’s contribution to the 
account is often voluntary and therefore may vary from year to year. Also, a 
typical DC plan is portable; the contribution into the account can be carried 
over if the person changes jobs. So, to get the cumulated benefits in the 
account of a person nearing his/her retirement one has to track the person’s 
entire employment history, (which is difficult to do) and the data from past 
jobs is of poor quality based on field experience. Moreover, it is hard to define 
a clear benchmark for “premature departure” from an employer for DC plan 
holders. It is for these reasons we leave DC plans out of the picture for this 
study. 
We chose workers from the first HRS cohort who were covered by DB 
plans on their current job when first interviewed in 1992 and tracked them 
until they left their 1992 employers.10 The reasons we used 1992 HRS cohort 
are two-fold. First, there was a database created by Bob Peticolas and Tom 
Steinmeier in which they calculated ER, NR and present value of pension 
benefits at multiple ages for 1992 HRS population with DB pensions. Such 
work is very hard to imitate given the time and resource available to the 
author.11  To take advantage of that database, I used 1992 HRS cohort. 
Secondly, there was a significant time-span (14 years, from 1992 to 2006) to 
                                                        
8
 For DB plans without ER, NR will play the role of ER.  
9
 For DB plans that don’t specify an ER, I treat NR as ER. So for the following analyses, the 
ER can either mean ER for plans that specify both ER and NR, or NR for those plans without 
an ER.   
10
 For the subjects haven’t retired from their 1992 employers, we track them until 2006 survey, 
the latest one available.  
11
 One has to get access to the restricted data—SSA Administrative data and 
employer-provided Summary Pension Descriptions (SPD)—to do this and it involves 
sophisticated estimations and imputations.  
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observe enough “events” within the population, which makes my analysis 
more accurate.12 
In this study, I intended to find out how well people responded to the 
pension incentives and try to find possible factors that might explain 
departures prior to ER. One factor that came to mind was the size of the 
pension. It is straightforward that the size of the pension can be viewed as a 
proxy of its influence on people’s behavior. One should naturally hypothesize 
that people with larger pension plans care more about them and may be more 
hesitant to miss the “bonus” at ER. As this effect is expected to be stronger 
among workers who understand the incentive, I considered the correlation 
between pension size and financial knowledge. 
Given the importance of pensions for people’s wellbeing after retirement, 
one might think that workers should be well-informed about the rules 
governing their employer-and government-provided pensions. But often they 
are not. Gustman and Steimeier (2000) investigated what workers knew about 
their pensions and Social Security. They compared the self-reported social 
security, DC and DB pension values to the government/employer reported 
figures. They also reported the discrepancies between self-reported and 
employer-reported NR and ER. They found an overall “pessimistic” pattern 
(people tend to underestimate their benefits) in self-reported variables. Then 
they reported positive effects of pension knowledge on accuracy of people’s 
retirement expectations (better-informed people are more likely to retire closer 
to the ages they said they were planning to do so.). Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) 
defined people’s “financial literacy” from three basic questions in 2004 HRS 
survey. They found people had poor financial literacy and that financial 
literacy was strongly correlated in positive ways with self-reported 
“carefulness” of retirement planning and wealth accumulation. 
In line with these studies, I hypothesized pension knowledge should be 
negatively correlated with the behavior of premature departure: people who 
have better knowledge about their pensions would be more aware and respond 
to the incentive mechanism implied in the pension structure more sensitively. I 
have to emphasize here that the pension information in the PV database 
(pension type, NR, ER and pension value at specific ages) were employers’ 
records or estimations based on SSA data, people’s own reports of earning 
history and employers’ Summary Plan Descriptions (SPD), therefore to be 
reasonably objective and accurate. I treated them as “real”. People’s answers 
                                                        
12
 “Event”, or “failure”, is a term in survival analysis meaning “final outcome of 
observations”. Here “events” mean “retirement” and whether or not it happens “before ER”. 
Too few “events” always raise doubt about the representativeness and convincingness of the 
results.  
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to: “What type of pension do you have?”, “What is the earliest age at which 
you would be eligible to receive reduced/full retirement benefits?” and “What 
amount do you expect to have for retirement benefit?” etc. are what they 
“perceived” their pensions would be. I considered those to be people’s pension 
knowledge. The idea was to match people’s “self-reported” (i.e. 
“self-perceived”) pension information with the actuality and compare across 
the two groups (early-leaving vs. non-early-leaving) to see whether the 
hypothesis held. I considered two easy pension knowledge indicators in this 
study: whether or not one can correctly specify his/her pension type; and, what 
is the difference between one’s self-reported ER and/or NR and those shown 
in PV database. 
Health is a determinant in people’s retirement decisions as it is in many 
other aspects of seniors’ lives. HRS collected rich information on respondents’ 
physical and mental health statuses, using both subjective and objective 
measures. Dwyer and Mitchell (1998) showed that the self-rated (subjective) 
health measures were not endogenous, so I chose two simple general health 
ratings: “How do you feel about your health?” and “How is it compared to two 
years ago (last survey)?” and see their influence on retirement behavior. 
The fourth factor that might contribute to leaving one’s employer before 
ER is the “Early Retirement Window.” Early retirement windows are special 
incentives to stimulate retirement at a particular time. Typically, if a firm 
wants to downsize, it will make “Early Retirement Window” offers to targeted 
employees. Window offer receivers are allowed one to three months to make a 
decision whether to accept the offer and leave. Incentives take the forms of 
cash bonuses, improvement in or accelerated eligibility for pension benefits, 
and health insurance continuation.13 It is possible that these events, occurred 
more often since the 1990s, and may have influenced some who would 
otherwise retire at or past ER to retire prior to ER because they were allured 
by the generosity of the window offer or they feel pessimistic about the 
prospect of the firm and would rather jump off the boat earlier. We 
hypothesized that receiving, and more importantly, accepting early retirement 
window offers would correlate positively to early departures. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes 
the data source, sample restrictions and definitions of key variables. In Section 
3 I investigate the correlation between workers’ pension size, pension 
knowledge, self-reported health status and early retirement window offers and 
their retirement behavior. Section 4 presents and discusses the results from 
                                                        
13
 See Charles Brown (2002) for more information on “early retirement window offers” in 
wave 1 to 4 of HRS.  
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several logistic regression models. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
2.1 The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 
The data for this study came from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 
database. Initiated at the University of Michigan and mainly sponsored by the 
National Institute on Aging, HRS is a nationwide survey project started in 
1992. In that year, a nationally representative sample of those who were born 
between 1931 and 1941 was interviewed. Over the next six years, younger and 
older birth cohorts were added and followed longitudinally.14 Thus, since 
1998, HRS staff interview about 22,000 Americans age 50 and older every two 
years. The design is to track the respondents until their deaths15, collecting 
longitudinal data on physical and mental health, disability, employment status 
and job history, housing, financial status (wealth and income), family support 
systems and retirement planning among other topics. In 1998 and 2004, new 
cohorts targeting population with more recent birth years were added. 
An important innovation in HRS is that on top of the survey data, it 
collects information about the respondents or the households from other 
sources. Putting these different sources together enabled us to know more 
about human behavior. For instance, we could get the respondents’ payroll tax 
records from the Social Security Administration and compute the benefits for 
which they would be eligible when they retired. One can then compare these 
calculated values with respondents’ own estimates of their Social Security 
benefits. Similarly, one can utilize employer-provided pension descriptions to 
estimate respondents’ pension benefits and compare them with self-reported 
data. To protect respondents’ confidentiality, such data are available only upon 
requests and approvals. Fortunately, information derived from the confidential 
pension descriptions was made available without restriction, and this Pension 
Present Value Database is used in this study. 
2.2 Variables and Sample 
I use the “employment” section and the “health” section of the HRS core 
datasets, HRS Cross-wave Tracker File (2006) and the 1992 HRS Pension 
Present Value database established by Bob Peticolas and Tom Steinmeier for 
this study. 
2.2.1 Sample Restrictions 
                                                        
14
 Older cohorts include those who were born between before 1931. Younger cohorts are 
added every five years. The idea is to form a representative sample of Americans aging 50 and 
older. 
15
 In reality, of course there are missing cases (loss of contact), and refusals in later waves.  
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I studied only those who were part of the original 1992 HRS cohort, for 
the two reasons mentioned in the Introduction. I imposed the following 
restrictions to all 1992 HRS population to get the sample for my analysis. 
1) The person had to be “currently employed” when first interviewed in 
199216; 
2) The person’s pension information—pension type, NR and/or ER—for 
the “current” job (in 1992) was available in the Pension Present Value 
database; 
3) His/her birth year and month in the Tracker File was non-missing. 
Since the event we tracked is departure from 1992 employers, we wanted 
to wipe out those who had been retired in 1992. The first restriction did that. 
The second restriction had two data-cleaning functions: first, we only included 
those who were shown to be under a DB plan in PV database in our sample. 
Also, we required the NR and/or ER information in PV database to be 
available. Assuming the NR/ER calculation in PV database to be “actuality”, 
we used that information and the birth year and birth month data in the Tracker 
File to determine whether one left “early” or not (see 2.2.2 for more). As the 
data availability for other variables discussed below varies, the sample size 
was not always the same for different parts of the analysis. 
2.2.2 Retirement Timing 
Firstly we wanted to find people’s actual retirement ages, ER, NR and 
then decided whether one left from his/her 1992 employer prior to their ER or 
not. Respondents’ birth year and birth month were in HRS Cross-wave Tracker 
File (2006). Since we included only people who had a job in 1992 interview, 
in subsequent waves, there were always questions under the “employment” 
session “Whether you left the employer in the previous wave or not?”, “If so, 
when?” We could infer the month and year that the respondent left his or her 
1992 employer by taking the first nontrivial figures on “when (you left your 
employer in the previous wave)” questions. Then we calculated the retirement 
age by taking the difference of retirement year and birth year, adjusting by one 
if the retirement month is “smaller” than birth month. For technical purposes 
mentioned later, we define “retirement age” to be one’s age at the 2006 
interview (the latest interview to date) for those who hadn’t left their Wave 1 
employer till by then. We defined “retired” dummy to be one if one had a 
non-missing retirement year, zero otherwise. Respondents’ NR and ER data 
are available in the Present Value database. By comparing actual retirement 
age and ER (or NR, if ER is not available), we generated “early leaving” 
                                                        
16
 Given that the SPDs were collected in 1993, only those who were interviewed in 1992 
could have been included in the Present Value database. 
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dummy being one if one’s “actual” retirement age is smaller than the ER 
(he/she left before ER), zero otherwise. 
2.2.3 Pension Wealth 
We used “Scenario 1”17 calculations in the PV database to be the pension 
wealth of individuals at specific ages (in 1992, at ER, NR etc). CPIAUCNS 
(Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items) was used to 
transform the figures into 2008 dollars. 
2.2.4 Pension Knowledge 
As previously mentioned, as we had more objective and more accurate 
pension information in PV database, we considered the survey data in HRS 
cores to be one’s “pension knowledge”. For this study, we only looked at the 
two simplest questions asked under the “employment” section of the 1992 
survey. One asked the respondent to identify his/her own pension type: 
whether “the (retirement) plan is based on a formula involving age, years of 
service and salary”—a DB plan—or “money is accumulated in an account for 
you”—a DC plan. The other question states “What is the earliest age at which 
you could leave this employer and start to receive pension benefits?” We 
treated answers to this question as people’s self-perceived ER. We then 
compared these indicators of pension knowledge with the data in PV database. 
We did this for the early-leaving group and the non-early-leaving group 
separately. 
2.2.5 Health Status 
In every wave respondents were asked “Would you say your health is 
excellent, very good, good, fair or poor?” and “Compared to the last wave, 
would you say that your health is better, about the same or worse?”18.We 
tracked people’s answers to those questions and adopted the answers given in 
the last wave before they left their 1992 jobs as “health status factor” that 
might influence their retirement decision. For instance, if a person reported he 
left his 1992 employer in July 1997, then we took down his answers to the two 
                                                        
17
 “Present values of pensions were calculated for nine scenarios, each of which is 
compounded using a particular combination of the interest rate, the wage growth rate, and the 
inflation rate. Most users will probably want to use values from the first scenario, which uses 
the intermediate values for all three rates.”---from the codebook of the Present Value database 
constructed by Bob Peticolas and Tom Steinmeier. 
18
 The self-rating health is of five-point scale, with “1” being the best/most optimistic case 
(“excellent”) and “5” being the worst/most pessimistic case (“poor”). The self-rating change 
of health is a three-point categorical variable except for Wave 2. (In wave 2 this question is of 
of five-point scale. In latter waves, first respondents were asked “better/worse/about the same”. 
If the answer is “better”, then ask whether it is “much better”; If the answer is “better”, then 
ask whether it is “much better”; if the answer is “worse”, then ask whether it is “much worse”. 
It result in three variables on the health change. We could generate a five-pointer out of each 
three. But for now, we only consider the first health change question. 
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questions in Wave 3 interview conducted in 1996 as the “health status factors” 
for that observation. For the people who hadn’t left by the 2006 interview, we 
use their health status reported in 2006 interview. The rationale here was that 
though health history matters, the “recent health” may affect the retirement 
decisions more directly. For people in mid-ages, it is likely that a sudden 
decline in health forces premature retirement. For people with chronic diseases, 
the last wave health rating can still catch the influence of that on retirement. 
2.2.6 Early Retirement Window 
In every wave there were specific questions about “Whether the firm 
offered early out window since the last wave?” and “Whether you accept it”. 
We regard this as an “early retirement window factor”. We wanted to observe 
who took these packages and whether that was related to “early leaving” 
behavior. 
 
3. Descriptive Results 
3.1 Retirement Pattern and Pension Value 
Individuals in the sample of this study have birth years ranging from 1930 
to 1942. They were entering the age of retirement when Wave I interview took 
place in 1992. As previously specified, we selected only the respondents that 
were still in the labor force when they were interviewed for the first time to be 
in the sample. The pattern of their departure from their 1992 employers since 
then is shown in Figure 1. In Figure 1-1 I show the distribution of departure 
year. Soon after 1992, the departure peak came in 1995. There were mass 
departures between 1995 and 1999. Then the number of departures steadily 
decreased. Out of a total of 1592 respondents, there were 490 cases in which 
the respondents “hadn’t left their 1992 employer by the last interview in 2006” 
or HRS lost contact with this person permanently or temporarily and couldn’t 
identify their departure time. 
In terms of age when laving 1992 employers, we observed that 
“retirements” began to sharply increase from age 55. Age 60 to 62 is the most 
“popular” retirement phase. The mass retirements continued until age 65 and 
then declined. (See Figure 1-3) This pattern can be properly interpreted using 
information in Figure 1-4 and the Social Security eligibility age requirement19: 
as one can see in Figure 1-4, one of the three peaks of ERs is age 55, the 
increased number of departures at age 55 are probably the response to that. 
The big retirement spike at age 60 responds to another ER peak. For most 
people in my sample, age 62 is the minimum age at which one would be 
eligible for reduced Social Security benefits (the “early retirement age” for 
                                                        
19
 See http://www.ssa.gov/retire2/agereduction.htm for details. 
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Social Security) , resulting in the largest number of “retirement”. The 
retirement tides continue to age 65, the “normal retirement age” for Social 
Security for most individuals in our sample. There are 503 observations with 
missing retirement age. 
The distribution of DB pension wealth in the sample was highly uneven 
and left-skewed, as shown in Table 2. The median DB pension was about 
$81,500 in 1992 (in 2008 dollars), a little more than $100,000 by the time of 
ERs. The means were respectively approximately $175,000 and $195,000 at 
those times. A good number of people (more than 10%) were shown to have 
zero pension benefits in 1992, which meant they would have no pension 
benefit if they were to retire in 1992. This was probably due to a change of 
jobs. Their 1992 employers were probably new for them at that time and they 
hadn’t qualified the “tenure year” requirements set by firms. Size of pension at 
ERs ranged from less than $1,000 to more than $1.67 million. 
3.2 Pension Wealth and Early Retirement Behavior 
The average pension benefits at ER and the increment from 1992 to ER of 
the two groups can be seen at Table 3. One can readily find the huge difference 
between the two groups: by ER the early-leaving group would get a mean of 
approximately 118,000 dollars; on the contrary, the control group would get 
approximately 203,000 dollars on average (nearly 80% above that of 
early-leaving group). On the other hand, the early leaving group outmatched 
the non-early leavers on the increment of pension size from 1992 to ER. The 
increment of pension from 1992 to ER is how much more one can get if he 
waits until ER to leave the employer instead of leaving the job right away in 
1992, therefore it is a more proper measure of incentives. Then it seems a 
strange thing that people whose ER spike of pension accruals matter more to 
them don’t take it very seriously into their retirement decisions. But this is not 
un-understandable. The fact that they don’t respond to ER very sensitively 
might not an action out of financial innocence or ignorance. Actually based on 
this sample, one can show a positive correlation between one’s pension 
knowledge and one’s pension wealth. Their decisions of not taking advantage 
of the ER to retire might be because other things that one could get from work 
had more weights in their utility functions. An alternative hypothesis would be: 
people’s pension wealth and retirement timing might all relate to their 
sophistication and personality: a sophisticated, capable person with a 
workaholic and/or easygoing personality is more likely to hold a high position, 
earning handsome salary and owning more pension benefits. And the sense of 
achievement from work, his career ambition and his love of social and work, 
among other factors, may make him/her want to work for more years instead 
of retiring at ER in his/her fifties. A thorough test of this “capable person tend 
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to work past their ER” hypothesis is not easy and remains to be done. 
3.3 Pension Knowledge and Early Retirement Behavior 
As I discussed above, I linked the pension type and ER, NR information 
in the Present Value database with the HRS core dataset. And I regard the 
self-reported pension type and ER in HRS core as “self-knowledge”. The 
pension type data in the PV database is from employer-provided SPDs and can 
be considered accurate and “real”. The ER data is estimation based on the 
SPDs, respondent’s earnings and service come from the respondent reports, 
therefore more objective and reliable than self-reported ER. So the 
“mismatches” of survey data to PV database data is a proxy of “poor 
knowledge on one’s own pension”. The results are shown in Table4. 
From Table 4-1, we observe that nearly 30% of early leavers gave 
incorrect answers to the pension type question, while 15% percent of 
non-early leavers made the same mistake. On the whole, early leavers had 
poorer knowledge in the most basic question about their pensions. It is no 
wonder that they are more prone to disregarding the structure of DB pensions 
they have in their retirement planning. From Table 4-2, less than 20% from 
each group reported an early retirement age that was exactly the same as 
estimated early retirement age from PV database, the percentage of “exact 
matches” are comparable across the groups. But the early leaver group tend to 
report self-believed ERs that were one to five years too young than the 
calculated ERs (23.6%, 10.8% for the control group in this category) whereas 
the non-early leavers’ misses were more on the other side. If they would act 
based on their self-believed ERs, this result can explain their retirement 
pattern to some extents. These two findings verified out hypothesis on the 
pension knowledge. We should notice, however, the ER data in PV database is 
not absolutely “real” and accurate because it is based on limited knowledge 
about respondents and their self-reported job and earning history. Mismatches 
in Table 4-2 might also be caused by a wrongly estimated ER in PV database. 
3.4 Health and Early Retirement Behavior 
It is commonsense that health can affect the length of one’s career and 
retirement timing. Here we are interested whether poor health and/or sudden 
worsening in health forced some to leave before ER. As a starting point, we 
compared respondents’ self-rating health and health change variables (see 
Table 5). We can not see any significant results from both variables, either 
wave-by-wave or pooled comparison. One thing needed to mention is that we 
have about 300 observations in non-early-leaving group with missing values in 
health variables. 
3.5 Early Retirement Window and Early Retirement Behavior 
In Table 6, we summarized the EOW offers and acceptances to two 
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groups wave by wave. Most EOW offers and acceptances (over 90%) 
happened in the non-early leaving group. The two groups showed no evident 
difference in being offered EOW and taking EOW. So from this perspective, 
we could not find evidence supporting the hypothesis that EOW had an 
influence on people’s premature departure. 
 
4. Logistic Regressions 
Logistic regression results are presented in Table 7. We investigate the 
influences of factors on retirement timing and premature departure behavior. 
First we expand the “subject” dataset to a “subject-year” dataset: one 
respondent will have one observation for each year he/she stayed in the dataset 
(starting in 1992, ending in the retirement year; if he/she hadn’t retired in 2006 
interview, he/she would have (2006-1992=) 15 observations). The dependent 
variable for specification I to III is the “retired dummy”: being one for every 
observation of the same person if the person had left the 1992 employer by 
2006 interview, being zero otherwise. The dependent variable for specification 
IV and V is “early-leaving dummy”: being one for every observation of the 
same person if the person had left the 1992 employer prior to his/her ER, 
being zero otherwise. The age dummies equal to one if the person was at age 
in that year and zero otherwise. We include different age dummies for in 
different specifications: for specification I to III, we put in age52 to age68; for 
specification IV to VI, we exclude “age66”, “ag67” and “age68” because 
technically they “predict failure perfectly”.  The “atER” dummy equals to 
one only if the person retired at his/her ER and only being one for that 
retirement year, being zero otherwise. The “pastER” dummy equals to one in 
every year after the ER. Besides “pension type knowledge”, “EOW offer” and 
“EOW taker” dummies mentioned above, I divided the sample into four 
groups according to the size of their pensions and created three dummy 
variables for people in the second, third and the top quartile. Two health 
dummies are created based on answers to the “current health status” question: 
the “health_good” variable is one for every observation of a same person if 
that person reported to have “excellent” or “very good” health in the wave just 
before leaving 1992 employer, zero otherwise. Similarly, the “health_poor” 
variable is one if a person reported to have “fair” or “bad” health in the wave 
just before leaving 1992 employer, zero otherwise. Those whose answer were 
“good” (the choice in the middle) were the base group. All these factor 
variables are time-invariant. (i.e.: the value of factor variables are the same for 
difference observations of a same person.) 
The column I to III showed results on “retirement” odds. In specification I, 
all age dummies have odds ratio greater than one, meaning a person is more 
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likely to retire than not at every age. “Age62” and “age65” dummies have 
significantly larger odds ratios: we expect to see more than eight times 
increase in the odds of retiring at age 62 and more than six times increase in 
the odds of retiring at age 65. Age 62 is the “early retirement age” of Social 
Security and age 65 is the normal retirement age of Social Security for HRS 
cohort. We can see their huge influence there. Specification II adds in “atER” 
and “pastER” dummies. We can see conditional on age dummies, being atER 
only modestly increase the odds of retirement.20 In specification III, we can 
see that “EOW accept” can increase the odds of departure, which is 
straightforward. That both the positive rating and the negative rating of health 
status increase the odds of departure is interesting. Keep in mind that what 
“retirement” really means here is the departure from 1992 employers. One 
explanation of that finding may be: while poor health can force people out of 
the labor market, having very good health may encourage people move for 
new jobs in their fifties. 
The column IV to VI showed results on “early retirement” odds. In 
specification IV, the only independent variables are age dummies. The “older 
ages” tend to have smaller odds ratios, which is straight-forward: as age 
increases, the probability of passing the ER increases and retirement before 
ER decreases. “Age54” and “age57” have odds ratios that wildly overmatch 
others. Specification V and VI add in factor variables. Conditional on age 
dummies, pension size correlates with early departures in the expected 
directions: being in the bottom quartile by pension wealth increases the odds 
of premature departure by nearly 40%, being in the top quartile decreases the 
odds of premature departure, but the coefficients are not statistically 
significant. Correctly identifying one’s own pension type associated with 
much lower odds of premature departure (odds ratio being .418), and the result 
is statistically significant. This verifies the strong negative correlation between 
one’s pension knowledge and premature departure behavior. Both 
“optimistic/positive” and “pessimistic/negative” self-evaluations of health 
statuses are correlated with increasing odds of premature retirements. The 
positive relation between pessimistic/negative health self-evaluation and the 
early leaving odds supports my hypothesis to some extents. We interpret the 
positive relation between optimistic health self-evaluation and the early 
leaving odds to be: those persons might leave not to retire, but to go to better 
jobs. Contrary to the finding in the previous section, where we could not see 
impact of early retirement window on early departure, in logistic regressions 
                                                        
20
 I am aware that this result may be inconsistent with the theory and some existed studies 
based on this dataset. I haven’t been able to interpret this result. However, I have made sure, to 
the best of my ability, that there was no easy mechanical mistake there.  
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one can clearly see that accepting EOW is strongly positively correlated with 
premature departure. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The main goal of this study was to find out how well people responded to 
the retirement incentives related to DB pension structures and try to identify 
possible factors that might explain departures prior to one’s ER. Based on a 
sample of nearly 1,600 individuals in HRS 1992 cohort, we observed the 
distribution of people’s retirement ages correspond well to ER and NR of 
Social Security and DB pensions, something consistent with the theory. The 
distribution of people’s pension wealth is highly skewed: the median pension 
wealth is about 82,000 dollars (in 2008 dollars) but the average is more than 
170,000 dollars. 
The non-early-leaving group on average had significantly more lucrative 
pension benefits than the early-leaving group. But data on the increment of 
pension present value from 1992 to ER—a more proper measure of pension 
incentive for staying with the employers—and logistic regression models 
don’t support the original hypothesis that people with larger pension plans are 
more likely to stay with the employers till ER for the accrual spikes. The fact 
that they don’t respond to ER very sensitively doesn’t necessarily indicate 
their lack of awareness of their pensions. Instead we propose a more probable 
alternative hypothesis: people’s pension wealth and retirement timing might 
all relate to their capacity and personality. A person who is more capable and 
more passionate on his/her work is more likely to own a bigger pension 
package. Also, the sense of achievement from work and a busy business 
lifestyle might be more important in his/her utility function than the financial 
advantage of retiring around ER, pushing him/her to retire at a later age. 
The results from comparative analysis on people’s knowledge on their 
pension types and ERs and the logistic regressions showed that one’s basic 
knowledge has a strong correlation with the early departure behavior: people 
with poor knowledge on their pensions are more prone to leave prior to ER 
and miss the accrual spike. 
Statistics on overall health self-evaluations don’t show a lot of difference 
across the two groups. But results in logistic regressions show that people with 
both excellent and poor self-perceived health have higher odds of premature 
departure. The latter fit the “poor health force people out” hypothesis. The 
story behind the former result might be: people with good health left 1992 
employers not to retire, but to go to jobs they liked more. Data on early 
retirement windows show that the offer of early retirement windows don’t 
seem to influence the retirement timing or whether or not people leave prior to 
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ER, but the acceptance of EOW increases the odds of leaving prior to ER 
significantly. 
Overall, this study shed some lights on understanding retirement before 
ER for DB pension holders. Though the prevalence of DB pension is 
decreasing, the results of in this study still have implication in the design of 
public policy. For instance, “the-more-individual-choice-the-better” 
philosophy may not end up giving the less sophisticated people, often in the 
lower social economic status, the “seeming” benefits. Maybe more resource 
should be allocated to personal finance education etc. This study remains a 
very simple one: much work should be done to verify the actual causal chain 
in people’s retirement behavior. 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1: Retirement Pattern 
Figure 1-1 Distribution of Retirement Year 
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Note: 490 observations in our sample had no “Retirement Year” available or hadn’t 
retired by 2006. So for this graph, N = 1112. The “weight” is to take account of the 
diverse representativeness of different observations. The weight was specified in HRS 
Cross-wave Tracker File. 
Figure 1-2 Distribution of Retirement Wave 
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Note: N = 1112, as it was in Figure 1-1. The weights applied are the same as in Figure 1-1.  
Figure 1-3  Distribution of Retirement Age (weighted percentage) 
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Note: 503 observations in our sample had no “Retirement Age” reported. So for this graph,     
N = 1111. The weights applied are the same as in Figure 1-2.  
 
 
Figure 1-4 Distribution of Early Retirement Age (weighted percentage) 
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* N = 1111. The weights applied are the same as in Figure 1-3.  
 
Table 2: DB Pension Size * 
Percentile Pension Size in 1992 (in $, in 2008 dollars) 
Pension Size at ERs 
(in $, in 2008 dollars) 
10% 0 19,274.86 
25% 3,660.21 41,313.97 
50% 81,487.77 102,341.8 
75% 223,149.4 260,358.2 
90% 459,604.6 485,867.3 
95% 701,537.4 688,908.8 
Min 0 994.83 
Max 1,925,301 167,5593 
Mean 175,594.1 194,534.9 
s.d. 246,555.3 236,516.5 
Skewness 2.600 2.400 
*: The figures are weighted average. We didn’t exclude zero values, N = 1508. 
 
 
Table 3: Average Pension Benefits Comparison 
 Pension Value at ER 
(in $, 2008 dollars) 
Pension Increment from 1992 to ER 
(in $, 2008 dollars) 
 Early leavers Non-early leavers Early leavers Non-early leavers 
Mean 117,559.6 202,862.8 77,196.2 12,638.2 
Median 64,652.1 107,882.3 54,553.9 2,993.5 
s.d. 122,471 244279.5 72,433.1 104,113.4 
Skewness 1.511 2.320 1.435 1.015 
Sample size 151 1357 151 1357 
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Table 4: Pension Knowledge Comparison 
Table 4-1: Pension Type Mismatching 
 Early leavers Non-early leavers 
No. of people reported DC only 59.8* 204.1* 
Percentage 28.2% 15.7% 
Sample size 212.3* 1295.7* 
*: the figures are not integers because of weighting. 
 
Table 4-2: ER Mismatching 
 Early leavers Non-early leavers 
% of diff in [-20, -6] 8.87 2.37 
% of diff in [-5, -1] 23.63 10.76 
% of exact matches 17.9 19.59 
% of diff in [1, 5] 15.16 22.57 
% of diff in [6, 18] 3.44 22.21 
% of self-reported ER missing 31 22.49 
Sample size 145.7* 998.3* 
*: the figures are not integers because of weighting. 
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Table 5: Self-reported Health Status Comparison * 
 
Average health status rating 
(1: very good; 5: very poor) 
Average health status change rating 
(1: better; 2: almost same; 3: worse) 
Wave 
Early 
Leavers 
Non-Early 
Leavers 
Early Leavers 
Non-Early 
Leavers 
2 
1.56 
(.74) 
2.17 
(.93) 
2.04 
(.52) 
2.00 
(.48) 
3 
2.48 
(1.14) 
2.32 
(1.08) 
2.10 
(.59) 
2.05 
(.58) 
4 
2.61 
(.97) 
2.62 
(1.03) 
2.15 
(.56) 
2.14 
(.58) 
5 
2.43 
(1.04) 
2.38 
(1.02) 
2.02 
(.42) 
2.01 
(.57) 
6 
2.36 
(1.10) 
2.40 
(0.98) 
2.18 
(.72) 
2.00 
(.56) 
7 
3 
(--) 
2.69 
(1.02) 
1 
(--) 
2.04 
(.52) 
8 --- 
2.44 
(1.07) --- 
2.00 
(.59) 
Not 
retired 
--- 
2.54 
(1.00) --- 
2.07 
(.50) 
Total 
2.35 
(1.07) 
2.47 
(1.03) 
2.05 
(.55) 
2.10 
(.56) 
Sample 
size 
133 1037 133 1037 
* In the parentheses are the standard deviations.  
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Table 6: “Early Retirement Window” Comparison 
Table 6-1: “EOW” Offers Comparison 
Wave 
No. of EOW 
Offers 
No. of Offers to 
Non-Early 
Leavers 
No. of Offers to 
Early Leavers 
% of Offers to 
Early Leavers 
0* 1103.92 981.96 121.96 11.05 
2** 84.66 80.59 4.07 4.81 
3 97.76 89.64 8.12 8.31 
4 100.64 93.28 7.36 7.31 
5 40.82 39.54 1.28 3.14 
6 38.44 36.08 2.36 6.13 
7 24.11 22.03 2.08 8.62 
8 17.65 17.65 0 0.00 
Total 1508 1360.78 147.22 9.76 
*: Wave 0 counts the number of people that don’t get any EOW offers in any wave. 
**Wave 2 counts the number of people got EOW offer(s) between Wave 1 and Wave 2 
interview. The figures are not integers because of weighting. 
 
Table 6-2: “EOW” Takers Comparison 
Wave 
No. of EOW 
Offers taken 
No. of Offers 
taken by Early 
Leavers 
No. of Offers taken 
by Non-early 
Leavers 
% of Offers 
taken by Early 
Leavers 
0* 1324.17 130.12 1,194.06 9.83 
2** 16.47 0 16.47 0.00 
3 48.69 6.91 41.78 14.19 
4 57.31 7.36 49.96 12.83 
5 18.21 0 18.21 0.00 
6 25.16 1.38 23.78 5.47 
7 12.56 1.46 11.10 11.66 
8 5.42 0 5.42 0.00 
Total 1508 147.22 1360.78 9.76 
*: Wave 0 counts the number of people that don’t get any EOW offers in any wave. 
**Wave 2 counts the number of people got EOW offer(s) between Wave 1 and Wave 2 
interview. The figures are not integers because of weighting. 
21
Fei: Pension Incentives and Retirement
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2010
  
Table 7: Logistic regressions 
 Retirement Trend Early Leaving Factors 
 I II III  IV V VI 
Age52 .49 (.28) 
.58 
(.33) 
.41 
(.23)  
7.74** 
(7.13) 
7.43** 
(6.91) 
7.45** 
(6.93) 
Age53 1.07 (.38) 
1.24 
(.45) 
.87 
(.31)  
16.73** 
(13.27) 
15.75** 
(12.78) 
15.65** 
(12.68) 
Age54 1.53 (.46) 
1.77 
(.53) 
1.27 
(.38)  
30.15** 
(22.54) 
28.71** 
(21.92) 
28.53** 
(21.75) 
Age55 3.31** (.85) 
3.54** 
(.93) 
2.64** 
(.69)  
19.92** 
(15.21) 
19.15** 
(14.91) 
18.97** 
(14.76) 
Age60 5.42** (1.25) 
5.62** 
(1.28) 
4.54** 
(1.03)  
13.87** 
(10.56) 
13.24** 
(10.21) 
13.15** 
(10.11) 
Age61 4.29** (1.01) 
4.33** 
(1.02) 
3.69** 
(.86)  
10.28** 
(8.10) 
9.98** 
(7.95) 
9.90** 
(7.87) 
Age62 9.98** (2.24) 
9.95** 
(2.24) 
8.96** 
(1.99)  
11.23** 
(8.75) 
11.00** 
(8.67) 
10.95** 
(8.62) 
Age63 5.35** (1.28) 
5.31** 
(1.27) 
4.79** 
(1.14)  
9.27** 
(7.35) 
9.11** 
(7.27) 
9.09** 
(7.87) 
Age64 4.45** (1.10) 
4.40** 
(1.09) 
4.12** 
(1.14)  
9.61** 
(7.76) 
9.50** 
(7.70) 
9.52** 
(7.71) 
Age65 6.64** (1.61) 
6.52** 
(1.59) 
6.36** 
(1.54)  
.71 
(.86) 
.71 
(.86) 
.70 
(.86) 
AtER  1.21 (.21) 
1.14 
(.21)  --- --- --- 
PastER  1.27** (.13) 
1.25** 
(.14)  --- --- --- 
Pension_q1   1.04 (.08)   
1.37 
(.27)  
Pension_q4   .93 (.08)    
.81 
(.19) 
Pention Type   .95 (.08)   
.42** 
(.08) 
.41** 
(.08) 
Health_good   2.03** (.15)   
1.95** 
(.38) 
1.91** 
(.37) 
Health_bad   1.95** (.20)   
1.64** 
(.45) 
1.65** 
(.46) 
EOW_offer   1.07 (.10)   
.32** 
(.12) 
.31** 
(.11) 
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EOW_accept   2.58** (.27)   
3.29** 
(1.45) 
3.25** 
(1.45) 
Pseudo 2R  .050 .051 .081  .046 .081 .080 
 
The dependent variable for specification I, II and III is the “retired” dummy in a 
“subject-year” dataset, being 1 if the observation is a “retired” person (has left his/her 1992 
employer by 2006 interview) at the “retirement year”, being 0 otherwise. 
The dependent variable for specification IV V and VI is the “early-leaving” dummy in a 
“subject-year” dataset, being 1 if the person is an “early leaver” at his/her “retirement year”, 
being 0 otherwise. 
Odds ratios are reported. 
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